UKRAINE — A WAR OF ATTRITION, FINANCIAL PRESSURE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL
Ukraine is approaching another critical phase of the war. The immediate challenge is no longer limited to holding territory against Russian advances. Kyiv must also secure the financial resources required to sustain its military operations and keep the Ukrainian state functioning throughout 2027.
European support remains substantial, but the funding situation is becoming increasingly complicated.
The European Union approved a €90 billion support package covering 2026 and 2027. On October 30, the European Commission formally proposed allocating the remaining €45 billion for 2027, including €31.7 billion for defence and €13.3 billion for budgetary support.
However, this does not resolve Ukraine’s financial requirements.
President Volodymyr Zelensky has estimated that the war will cost approximately €155 billion in 2027 and has requested at least €70 billion in additional assistance.
The problem is not necessarily Europe’s willingness to continue supporting Ukraine. It is the growing difficulty of financing a war whose costs continue to rise while American assistance becomes increasingly uncertain.
Brussels is examining additional borrowing, including jointly issued European debt. EU leaders are expected to address the funding gap during their November 26–27 summit, alongside negotiations over the bloc’s next long-term budget.
Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has intensified pressure for a negotiated settlement. Relations between Washington and Kyiv have deteriorated, with Trump openly questioning Zelensky’s role in negotiations and the administration exploring renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow.
There has been limited progress.
A temporary humanitarian ceasefire around Oleshky in the Kherson region demonstrated that narrowly defined agreements remain possible. But a localized arrangement does not fundamentally change the military or political calculations driving the wider conflict.
On the battlefield, the situation is equally complicated.
Russia continues to pursue the remaining Ukrainian-held territories of Donbas, particularly the strategically important urban defensive belt stretching through Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.
These are not ordinary urban centers. Years of defensive preparation, extensive industrial infrastructure and interconnected positions make them particularly difficult to capture through direct assaults.
Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi has further complicated Moscow’s plans.
According to Ukrainian military commanders, the operation disrupted Russian advances north of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, recaptured 16 settlements and approximately 277 square kilometers, and weakened the northern approach required for a larger encirclement.
These territorial figures are Ukrainian military claims, but the broader significance is clear: Russia has not secured the operational conditions necessary for a rapid advance against the remaining Donbas strongholds.
Ukraine has also adapted its manpower strategy.
The recruitment of foreign volunteers, particularly from Latin America, has become increasingly important. Ukrainian military officials reported approximately 16,000 foreign volunteers serving in August 2026, with nearly 40% coming from Latin American countries.
This helps address personnel shortages, although foreign recruitment alone cannot resolve Ukraine’s wider mobilization challenges.
The civilian situation is deteriorating.
On October 22, Ukrainian authorities expanded mandatory evacuations for families with children to every settlement within the Kramatorsk and Sloviansk communities.
On October 31, a Russian airstrike destroyed Kramatorsk’s city executive committee building, demonstrating that the cities remain vulnerable to sustained aerial attacks even before a major ground assault.
My assessment:
A rapid Russian capture of the remaining Donbas defensive belt appears unlikely under current battlefield conditions.
The fighting could extend well into 2028 or 2029 if the present operational dynamics continue. However, neither the eventual fall of Donbas nor that timeline should be treated as inevitable.
Russia retains advantages in manpower and industrial capacity, while Ukraine continues to demonstrate an ability to disrupt larger Russian formations through drones, defensive preparation and localized counteroffensives.
The more immediate question is whether Ukraine can sustain that resistance financially.
Trump may increase diplomatic pressure, and European governments may struggle to meet Kyiv’s full requirements. But financial constraints do not automatically produce a negotiated settlement.
Both Moscow and Kyiv still appear to believe that continued fighting can improve their negotiating positions.
For now, the conditions for a prolonged war remain firmly in place.
ETHIOPIA — THE HORN OF AFRICA IS APPROACHING A DANGEROUS STRATEGIC CROSSROADS
The conflict in Ethiopia is moving beyond another internal security crisis.
What is emerging is a potentially wider confrontation involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tigrayan forces and the competing strategic interests of neighboring states.
The latest military developments make this increasingly concerning.
On October 28, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced a major agreement with Russia involving 12 Su-35 multirole fighter aircraft and four batteries of the S-400 long-range air-defence system.
Although Abiy referred to the delivery of 12 aircraft, subsequent reporting indicated that the initial physical handover consisted of two Su-35s.
The aircraft were delivered approximately one year ahead of the previously agreed schedule, according to the Ethiopian government.
The timing matters.
Ethiopia is simultaneously confronting renewed Tigrayan resistance, instability in other regions and escalating tensions with Eritrea over access to the Red Sea.
Advanced aircraft alone will not transform Ethiopia’s military capabilities overnight. Operational effectiveness depends on trained pilots, maintenance infrastructure, weapons integration and the ability to sustain high-tempo operations.
Nevertheless, Moscow’s decision to accelerate the delivery strengthens Ethiopia’s military position and signals the growing importance of Russian defence relationships in the Horn of Africa.
The more immediate concern lies along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border.
Following renewed fighting in Tigray, Ethiopian federal forces withdrew from several northern positions during October.
On October 22, Tigray Defence Forces aligned with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front reportedly retook Rama, a strategically sensitive town close to Eritrea.
The situation deteriorated further in the following days, with renewed clashes along routes connecting Rama to Ethiopian government-held positions.
On October 30, a reported Ethiopian military drone strike in Rama killed at least 12 civilians.
Separately, drone strikes on a displacement camp in the Amhara region reportedly killed at least 15 people, including children.
These developments illustrate how rapidly the confrontation is spreading across multiple fronts.
Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting Tigrayan forces and facilitating their operations. Eritrea rejects these allegations and maintains that Addis Ababa is using security claims to justify possible aggression.
Behind the immediate military confrontation lies a much larger strategic dispute.
Ethiopia wants secure access to the Red Sea. Eritrea views any attempt to obtain that access through military force as a direct threat to its sovereignty.
For Ethiopia, which has been landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, access to maritime trade routes is both an economic and strategic priority.
For Eritrea, the fear is that Ethiopia’s long-term ambitions could eventually translate into a military attempt to control the port of Assab or surrounding territory.
The regional alignment is also becoming more significant.
Egypt, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea have reinforced their position that Red Sea security and governance should remain under the authority of coastal states.
Somalia’s earlier confrontation with Ethiopia over the Somaliland maritime-access agreement added another layer of regional mistrust.
Egypt has its own longstanding disagreements with Ethiopia, particularly over Nile water security.
The result is an increasingly complicated regional security environment in which an Ethiopian-Eritrean confrontation could draw in additional actors.
My assessment:
The probability of direct military confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea has increased substantially.
However, an Ethiopian invasion should not yet be regarded as unavoidable.
Abiy faces a difficult strategic calculation.
Opening another major front against Eritrea would require significant military resources while Ethiopian forces remain engaged against Tigrayan and other armed groups.
Air superiority could provide Ethiopia with an advantage, but occupying and holding territory across mountainous defensive positions would present an entirely different challenge.
Eritrea could also respond asymmetrically by expanding support to armed groups operating inside Ethiopia, forcing Addis Ababa to distribute its resources across several fronts.
External financial and military assistance could influence the balance, but it would not eliminate these operational constraints.
The danger is that both sides may increasingly view escalation as preferable to strategic retreat.
Russia’s weapons deliveries, Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, Eritrean security concerns and the renewed Tigray conflict are converging at precisely the wrong moment.
The Horn of Africa is entering a period in which one miscalculation could transform a domestic conflict into a wider interstate war.
IRAN / YEMEN — DIPLOMACY CONTINUES WHILE THE MILITARY CONFLICT EXPANDS
The confrontation involving Iran, the United States and Israel has reached another difficult diplomatic stage.
Negotiations remain active, but the fundamental disagreements preventing a settlement have not been resolved.
Qatar, with support from other regional intermediaries including Pakistan, has continued efforts to broker an agreement between Tehran and Washington.
The latest Qatari proposal initially outlined a seven-day sequence of confidence-building measures intended to create conditions for wider negotiations.
Iran rejected the initial terms as insufficient.
However, indirect discussions continued through October 31 and November 1, with Iranian representatives engaging Qatari mediators in Doha.
There has been some movement on the proposed timetable.
Iran has reportedly indicated that it could reopen the Strait of Hormuz within two days if Washington lifts restrictions on Iranian oil shipping, facilitates the release of frozen assets and removes sanctions affecting oil exports.
Qatar is also attempting to secure the release of more than $6 billion in Iranian assets as part of a possible understanding.
The central disagreement remains unchanged.
Washington wants Iran’s nuclear programme included in negotiations from the beginning.
Tehran insists that the economic blockade and sanctions must be addressed before any meaningful nuclear discussions can proceed.
Both sides are effectively demanding significant concessions before committing to the next stage.
The timing is particularly sensitive.
With American midterm elections scheduled for November 3, regional governments are increasingly concerned that Washington could resume military operations once the vote is over.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has maintained that Trump prefers a diplomatic resolution, while emphasizing that military options remain available.
Iran has responded by placing its forces on heightened alert.
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has instructed the military to prepare for an immediate response to any renewed attack.
This creates a dangerous situation in which diplomacy and military preparation are taking place simultaneously.
Yemen: The conflict is entering another active military phase
While negotiations over Iran continue, the situation in Yemen has deteriorated significantly.
The Houthis have increased missile operations against Saudi-backed forces and infrastructure, while the Saudi-led coalition has intensified attacks against Houthi positions.
On October 28, Houthi forces attacked Aden International Airport after publicly demanding its evacuation.
Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree claimed that a Saudi aircraft carrying military equipment was operating from the facility.
The attack disrupted civilian aviation and forced the temporary suspension and diversion of flights. Operations subsequently resumed, although the security threat remains.
The more strategically important fighting is taking place around Taiz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
The Houthis have attempted to consolidate positions along important coastal approaches and mountainous terrain, while Saudi-backed government forces have reported territorial gains near the strait.
Control of these areas has implications far beyond Yemen.
Bab al-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and forms part of a shipping route linking Asian markets with Europe through the Suez Canal.
With Iranian restrictions already affecting maritime movement through the Strait of Hormuz, renewed instability around Bab al-Mandeb creates additional pressure on international trade and energy transportation.
The humanitarian consequences are becoming severe.
In Taiz, Governor Nabil Shamsan has warned that the city faces critical shortages of water, food, medical supplies and fuel.
The World Food Programme says access to more than 600,000 people dependent on humanitarian assistance has been disrupted.
Saudi airstrikes have also caused civilian casualties. On October 29, Houthi health authorities reported that an attack in western Taiz killed at least 13 people.
On November 1, Houthi-controlled media reported further strikes on the University of Hodeida’s medical school, while the Saudi-led coalition acknowledged conducting a military operation without confirming the reported target.
The overall pattern suggests that the conflict is shifting from intermittent military exchanges toward a broader campaign involving infrastructure, territorial control and economic pressure.
My assessment:
The Houthis retain the ability to sustain prolonged fighting despite Saudi air superiority.
Their defensive advantages lie primarily in difficult terrain, prepared positions, decentralized military structures and experience accumulated through years of conflict.
Saudi-backed forces may achieve localized territorial gains, particularly with effective air support, but those gains do not necessarily translate into the elimination of Houthi military capabilities.
The Houthis can continue threatening Saudi infrastructure and maritime traffic without controlling every strategically important coastal position.
This makes a decisive military conclusion difficult.
The wider Iranian confrontation is also shaping events in Yemen, although the conflict has its own political, tribal and territorial dynamics that cannot be reduced entirely to Tehran’s decisions.
A settlement between Washington and Iran could reduce the strategic incentives for escalation. It would not automatically end Yemen’s civil war.
Conversely, if negotiations fail and renewed military pressure is applied against Iran, the Houthis could expand their operations as part of a broader regional confrontation.
The principal risk is a simultaneous escalation around Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.
Such a development would place additional pressure on global energy supplies, maritime insurance costs, shipping routes and regional security.
The coming weeks may determine whether diplomatic pressure produces a limited agreement or whether the Middle East enters another phase of direct military confrontation.
THE BIGGER PICTURE
Ukraine, Ethiopia and Yemen represent different conflicts, but a common strategic pattern is emerging.
Diplomatic activity is increasing without corresponding reductions in military preparation.
In Ukraine, the central constraint is increasingly financial sustainability alongside battlefield attrition.
In Ethiopia, unresolved territorial ambitions and internal instability are creating the conditions for a wider regional conflict.
In Iran and Yemen, competing demands over sanctions, maritime access and military security are preventing meaningful de-escalation.
Across all three theatres, the parties involved continue to calculate that additional military pressure could improve their eventual negotiating positions.
That calculation may prove increasingly expensive.
The greatest danger is not necessarily that diplomacy has failed. It is that governments may continue negotiating while preparing for wars they increasingly believe are unavoidable.